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A B S T R A C T   
This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of global energy 
companies. Data from 121 listed energy companies from 2010 to 2019 were collected for empirical analysis. The 
results show that in the energy industry, executive compensation has a significant positive impact on corporate 
performance, which is consistent with agency theory, tournament theory and social network theory. In addition, 
we found that cash incentives are more useful than equity incentives for senior executives. Therefore, we 
recommend that energy companies establish a reasonable compensation incentive system to address agency 
issues in the sector.   
1. Introduction 
In contemporary society, high executive compensation has become a 
global concern. According to a 2017 survey by the US Bloomberg 
Consulting Company in 22 countries around the world, CEO’s 
compensation is dozens or even hundreds of times that of ordinary 
employees both in developed and developing countries. The United 
States, India, the United Kingdom, South Africa, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Germany, and China occupy the top ten of 
the payment gap lists, which indicates high CEO payment compared to 
most lower and middle-level employees in these countries. According to 
the statistics of the American ‘Fortune’ magazine in 2017 (titled: Top 
CEOs Make More in Two Days Than An Average Employee Does in One Year, 
2017), in 1980, the compensation of the head of a large American 
company was 42 times the average of typical workers, and now this 
number has soared to about 300 times. The average annual compensa-
tion of CEOs of large American companies has reached 14.2 million US 
dollars, and some have even reached hundreds of millions [1]. The gap 
between rich and poor in Northern Europe is relatively small. Even so, 
the compensation of the CEO in Sweden is 60 times higher than the 
average employee, about 8.5 million dollars. According to Forbes’ 2016 
ranking of the 25 most paid CEOs in Russia (Russia’s 25 highest paid 
CEOs, 2016), their average annual income is $6.1 million. However, the 
average annual income of ordinary Russian employees is 8,040 dollars. 
The 8-day income of Brazilian bosses is equal to the annual salary of 
employees, while in Mexico, it only takes 4 days. Practically, the exec-
utives of modern companies around the world are highly paid, which is 
easy to cause dissatisfaction among the public. 
According to a national survey by Stanford University, ‘74% of 
Americans believe that CEO salaries are too high compared to typical 
workers.’ Although the survey respondents ‘seriously underestimated’ 
the compensation of the CEO. In 2011, the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ move-
ment broke out in New York and quickly developed into an international 
movement. Protests were held in 951 cities in 82 countries [1]. The 
‘Occupy Movement’ protested that executives were overpaid, occupied 
the resources of enterprise development, destroyed the enterprise and 
let the government rescue the market, harming the interests of all tax-
payers, that is, using 99% of people’s hard-earned money to meet the 
greed of 1% people. 
However, the debate about the impact of executive compensation on 
corporate performance has existed for a long time. Although many 
people believe that high executive compensation is a waste of corporate 
resources, which is not conducive to corporate development, and there 
are also some arguments that improving executive compensation has a 
positive effect on corporate performance. According to agency theory, 
executive compensation, especially those linked with performance, 
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could limit agency problems through aligning the interests of managers 
with shareholders [2]. Many studies have already eastablished a positive 
relationship between executive compensation and corporate perfor-
mance. There are alsoempirical studies showing a ngative or a weak 
relationship between governance-performance. 
This article selects energy companies worldwide to explore the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. 
The development of energy promotes the progress of human civilization. 
The discovery of coal propelled the first industrial revolution, and the 
discovery and exploitation of oil further promoted the development of 
human society, and this highlights the significance of the issue. 
This article has several contributions. First, it helps to understand 
whether executive compensation contributes to company performance 
in the energy industry, thereby promoting the establishment of effective 
incentive mechanisms. This article is a supplement to previous research 
on energy companies. Ullah et al. (2019) concentrated on oil-rich 
developing countries and studied the natural resource ‘curse’. Some 
studies focusing on other aspects, such as the transformation of renew-
able energy. With regards to the relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate performance, there are only studies carried 
out in specific regions. Moreover, this study could confirm the as-
sumptions of interrelated interdisciplinary theories to a certain extent. 
Some theories support high executive salaries and some oppose them. 
Agency theory believes that high remuneration could push executives to 
work hard for the benefit of the company. Tournament theory believes 
that a large salary gap could promote the improvement of company 
performance. Social network theory suggests that companies should pay 
high salaries to retain connected managers, which is beneficial to the 
response to crises and long-term development of the companies. How-
ever, relative deprivation theory believes that a huge wage gap will 
make workers feel unfair and is not conducive to the development of 
enterprises. Organizational political theory argues that the huge gap 
would cause employees to adopt unethical methods to obtain pro-
motions. This article could prove which theory fits in the global listed 
energy companies. The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 
2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 presents methodology. Section 4 
presents and the findings and finally section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
Jensen and Meckling [4] proposed agency theory, which can explain 
the relationship between executive compensation and corporate per-
formance. The principal-agent relationship generally exists in various 
organizations in the modern economy [48–50]. It is a contractual rela-
tionship, which generally refers to any transaction involving asymmetric 
information. Agency costs can be divided into three parts: First, the cost 
of supervision by the principal, that is, the cost of the principal stimu-
lating the agent in order to make the latter work for the benefit of the 
former; the second is the cost of guaranteeing the agent, that is, the cost 
of the agent to ensure that he/she does not take the behavior that harms 
the principal, and the cost of compensation if that behavior is adopted; 
the last is the residual loss, which is a result of the agent’s 
decision-making. This loss of value is equal to the difference between the 
agent’s decision-making and the principal’s decision to maximize its 
own utility under the assumption that he/she has the same information 
and ability as the agent. Obviously, the first two are the actual costs of 
making, implementing and governing contracts, and the third is the 
opportunity cost. 
In enterprises, the owners tend to entrust professional managers to 
manage the companies. In such a relationship, the owner is the principal 
and the manager acts as the agent. Agency theory believes that the most 
critical game between them lies in information asymmetry [46]. Man-
agers know well about company affairs due to direct management power 
and professional ability, while shareholders have less information. The 
information asymmetry is not conducive to shareholder monitoring 
whether managers are serving the interests of shareholders 
appropriately or not. According to the rational economic man hypoth-
esis, which is also followed by the agency theory, managers are 
self-interested and they may harm the interests of the company (share-
holders) in order to seek personal gain. This would lead to an increase in 
agency costs. Davis et al. [5] argue that after an acquisition, the CEO 
asks for a higher remuneration because he/she has to take on more re-
sponsibilities in a newly merged entity. 
To ensure that managers work in the interests of shareholders and to 
decrease the agency costs, they sign a contract that motivates managers. 
Shareholders tend to link the compensation of executives with corporate 
performance through a compensation incentive system, thereby aligning 
the interests of both parties. CEO remuneration usually consists of three 
parts. The first is cash payments, that is, wages and annual bonuses; the 
second is benefits, such as pensions, insurance, and other rewards; the 
third is restricted stocks and options. Shareholders comprehensively 
take each part into consideration when formulating executive compen-
sation contracts. With the development of society and economy, many 
companies and enterprises adopt equity incentives, because this allows 
managers and companies to become a real community of interests. 
However, agency theory has been criticized by some scholars in the 
accounting and governance research. Ghoshal [6] believes that the 
frequent occurrence of fraud cases in recent decades shows that agency 
theory is sometimes difficult to achieve the ideal goal for improving 
corporate governance in practice. However, there are still many fraud 
cases around the world. Enron Corporation, Toshiba Corporation, World 
Communications Corporation, Xerox and many other world-renowned 
companies have committed large-scale financial frauds. One recent 
case is the fraud by the German electronic payment giant Wirecard. In 
2019, the 1.9 billion euros it reported on the account did not exist which 
is classic example of corporate governance failure. 
Most studies believe that compensation incentives have a strong 
positive impact on corporate performance. Demirer and Yuan [7] ob-
tained data on catering companies in the United States from the last 
century to the beginning of this century. They argued that bonuses and 
non-equity compensation have a positive impact on the performance of 
the restaurant company. Non-equity compensation has received little 
attention from scholars, but executives often receive large amounts of 
pensions and deferred remuneration. The catering industry generally 
uses long-term cash incentive plans to reward executives based on per-
formance. The results also show that compensation in cash form may 
have a negative impact on the performance of catering companies. The 
main finding of Gregg et al. Gregg et al. (2011) was that company size 
has a major impact on executive compensation. After studying constit-
uent companies of FTSE 350, they found that although directors in the 
financial industry receive higher payments than other industries, they 
are not subject to over-motivation because the salary-performance 
sensitivity of the financial industry is not significantly high. Kato et al. 
[8] selected 246 listed companies in South Korea and they found that in 
South Korea, executive cash payments have a significant positive cor-
relation with stock market performance. Scholars Zhao and Gao [9] 
found that in the media industry in China, there is a positive relationship 
between the salary level of the senior management and the performance 
of the company. 
Some studies believe that executive payment and corporate perfor-
mance are weakly linked, or even negatively related. Bootsma [10] 
selected Dutch listed companies from 2002 to 2007 as the sample. His 
research shows that after the introduction of the Dutch Code of Corpo-
rate Governance in 2004, the relationship between salary and perfor-
mance has been strengthened. This is mainly due to the increased use of 
equity-based compensation. However, the relationship between salary 
and performance in the Netherlands is still weaker than most countries 
around the world. In the study on a large number of Indian listed 
companies, Parthasarathy et al. [11] fell to find a significant impact of 
net profit margin and ROA on executive remuneration. Gill [12] also 
observed some companies in India. He found that even companies that 
performed poorly paid huge compensation to CEOs. 
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This article selects energy companies worldwide, collects their data 
in recent 10 years, and uses panel data for quantitative research. In order 
to ensure the comparability of the research, countries with two-tier 
board structure such as Germany were excluded. 
3. Data, model, and methodology 
This article focuses on large-scale energy companies with total assets 
of more than US $7 billion. The selected companies belongs to the S&P 
Global 250 Energy List S&P Global 250 Energy List (2019). Limited to 
the data availibility for several variables, 85 companies from WRDS 
(Wharton Research Data Services) and 36 companies from CSMAR 
(China securities market), 121 companies around the world were 
selected and data was collected from 2010 to 2019 were used.. For 
CSMAR data, the exchange rate on the last day of the year was used to 
convert Renminbi into U.S. dollars so as to be combined with WRDS data 
for processing. Individual data with incomplete information disclosure 
in certain year were eliminated. The shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder comes from Wind, and committee data partly comes from 
SEC reports. 
This study uses Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE to measure firm perfor-
mance. Tobin’s Q value is the ratio of the market value of a company’s 
stock to the replacement cost of the asset represented by the stock [7]. 
According to CSMAR calculation method, Tobin’s Q (TQ) is defined as 
follows in E1:  
TQ = MV/(TA - INA - GW)                                                             (1) 
MV is market value and is calculated as share price multiplied by the 
number of common stock shares outstanding; TA is the book value of the 
company’s total assets; INA is intangible asset; GW is the goodwill. 
ROA is the percentage of net profit to the total asset of a firm, which 
is a useful indicator for evaluating the profitability of a company relative 
to its total asset value. ROE is the percentage of net profit to average 
shareholders’ equity. This indicator reflects the level of return on 
shareholder equity and is used to measure the efficiency of the com-
pany’s use of its own capital. The higher the index value, the higher the 
return from investment [13]. These two indicators are also commonly 
used in the literature in measuring company performance. 
The largest component of Executive compensation is usually remu-
neration and equity. Compensation is measured by the natural logarithm 
of the total remuneration of the top three executives, and the equity part 
is the proportion of shares held by executives. With these two indicators, 
the cash effect and non-cash effect on enterprise performance could be 
figured out and compared. Agency theory believes that agents (execu-
tives) are self-oriented by nature, consequently they may attempt to 
harm the interests of principals (shareholders) to satisfy themselves, 
receiving high payment would reduce their motivation to infringe the 
company and reduce the agency costs of the company [4]. Equity in-
centives could help in coordinating the interests of executives and 
shareholders and hence encouraging executives to work harder. Tour-
nament theory believes that the payment gap between executives and 
ordinary employees is beneficial to improving firm performance [14]. 
Social network theory suggests that companies should spend a lot of 
money to retain well-connected executives, which would create great 
value for the company [15]. Modern companies in the world tend to 
combine salary incentives with equity incentives, and some other 
non-fionancial rewards. Many scholars have concluded that executive 
payment has a positive effect on firm performance [7,9,16–19]; etc.). On 
the other hands, some studies have found different results in some 
countries and industries [10,12,20]. These results support views that 
conflict with agency theory. Scholars who oppose agency theory believe 
that it assumes that managers are selfish and opportunistic, Although 
such assumptions cannot be generalised in different cultural and insti-
tutional contexts [6]. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes 
the following hypotheses: 
H1：Executive compensation positively affects corporate 
performance. 
H2：Executive shareholding ratio positively affects corporate 
performance. 
Desender [21] argued that ownership concentration plays an 
important role in corporate governance. Executive directors have the 
motivation and opportunity to sacrifice company interests to satisfy 
self-interest. Relatively high equity concentration results in controlling 
shareholders having sufficient motivation to collect information and 
supervise the managers, which contributes to the improvement of firm 
performance [22]. The concentration is measured by the shareholding 
ratio of the largest shareholder. 
In addition, an audit committee, strategic committee, a nomination 
committee, and a remuneration committee play an important role in 
moinotoring. In some countries and regions, the risk committee is also 
quite popular. These committees are specialized working bodies estab-
lished by the board of directors in accordance with the resolutions of the 
general meeting of shareholders, and in line with the requirements of the 
governance codes [23]. The establishment of these committees is 
conducive to reducing the conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
between large shareholders and small shareholders, and protecting the 
interests of other stakeholders. It is commonly believed that the greater 
the number of committees, the better the corporate governance & 
monitoring at the top of the firm. 
With regards to other control variables we used gearing and firm size 
as control variable. Many researchers believe that firm size significantly 
influences firm performance because of the scale effect [24]. First, large 
companies have much advantages because they could invest a lot of 
talent and money in research and development. Secondly, large com-
panies tend to form marketing networks more quickly than small com-
panies, relying on their brands, economic strength, and personnel. 
Third, it is easier for large firms to raise external funds. Fourth, large 
companies have specialized division of labor, which could increase 
production efficiency and reduce costs, thus increasing the marginal 
benefits [25]. However, some researchers suggest that there is no 
obvious link between firm size and corporate performance (Shi 2014; 
[26]). 
Gearing is the ratio of debt to equity, which measures the capital 
structure of a company. In high capital-intensive industries, utilities and 
consumer goods industries, gearing is usually higher, and lower in ser-
vice industries. If the debt-to-equity ratio is larger than average in the 
industry, it can be considered that this company is faced with higher 
financial risk [51]. However, if the debt ratio is too low, it may also 
indicate that the company’s management is relatively conservative and 
lacks enterprising awareness. Gearing could influence corporate per-
formance in a complicated way [27]. Scholars hold different ideas, but 
many scholars believe that high leverage has a negative impact on 
business operations [52,53]. 
OLS method is applied in this research. We carried out a series of 
endogeneity test and these test confirms no major issue of endogeneity, 
particulary with regards to the explanatory variables [54,55]. The 
regression models in this article are structured as follows:    
TQ= α0 + α1LNSit + α2MSRit + α3LNAit + α4GEARit + α5LHRit + α6NOit + μit (2)   
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These equations could examine the relationship between corporate 
performance with executive compensation and control variables 
separately. 
Variables used in the data analysis are presented in Table 1. 
4. Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistics of relevant data are shown in Table 2. The 
mean value of ROE is 11.480%, and the median value is 10.226%. The 
average ROA is 6.274% and the total data vary from − 4.758% to 
28.020%. Tobin’s Q is calculated through market value divided by total 
assets minus intangible assets and goodwill. Some companies have a 
very high proportion of intangible assets and goodwill, which is not very 
convincing in explaining their assets [28]. Explanatory variables include 
the natural logarithm of the compensation of top three executives (LNS) 
and the proportion of stocks held by executives (MSR). The average LNS 
is 8.584 and the median data is 9.550. The ratio of shareholding of 
managers range between 0 and 57.108%. The mean value of 1.097% and 
median value of 0.210% show that most executives of energy companies 
hold a small number of shares. The average LNA is 9.876, which is very 
close to the median value of 9.911. The mean value of Gearing is 0.273 
and the median is 0.204. The shareholding ratio of the largest share-
holder varies greatly from 0.370% to 87.460%. And the average value is 
21.634%. The mean of committee numbers is 4.441 and the median is 4. 
In most countries in the world, the board of directors has at least four 
committees: strategic committee, nomination committee, remuneration 
committee and audit committee. In order to better corporate gover-
nance, some energy companies have set up more committees such as 
environment committees [47]. 
Table 3 provides correlation coefficient among corporate perfor-
mance, executive payments and other variables. Executive compensa-
tion (LNS) is obviously positively-linked with return on equity (0.2167) 
and return on total assets (0.4058), which consists with hypothesis 1. 
Tobin’s Q has slight negative correlation with LNS and the coefficient is 
− 0.1357. There is obvious positive relationship between shareholding 
ratio of managers and firm performance (three coefficients are all 
positive). It could be preliminarily drawn to the conclusion that hy-
pothesis 2 is accepted. The correlation between total asset (LNA) and 
firm performance is unsure because among the three coefficients, two 
numbers are slightly positive and one is slightly negative (0.0573, 
0.0712, − 0.1387). Gearing is negatively correlated with return on assets 
(− 0.2654), however, positively correlated with Tobin’s Q (0.1613). 
Hypothesis 3 & 4 needs further confirmation. The shareholding ratio of 
the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with ROE and ROA, and 
positively correlated with Tobin’s Q. The number of committees is 
negatively correlated with company performance. 
Table 4 shows the coefficients from the OLS regression analysis of the 
relationship between performance variables and other determinants. 
The regression analysis shows that the regression coefficients be-
tween the natural logarithm of executive compensation (LNS) and the 
three indicators (ROE, ROA, TQ) that measure corporate performance 
are all positive, and the former two are significant at the level of 1%. 
This means that LNS has a significant positive influence on ROE and 
ROA, and a positive influence on Tobin Q. Return on equity is often used 
to measure the efficiency of a company’s use of capital invested by 
shareholders [29]. Return on asset is an indicator used to measure how 
much net profit is created per unit of asset [30]. Tobin’s Q value is the 
ratio of a company’s market value to its asset replacement cost. It is 
often used to measure company performance or company growth [7]. 
Hypothesis 1 states that executive compensation positively affects 
corporate performance is confirmed. This result is consistent with 
agency theory and many other researches. Managers who are satisfied 
with high income would put the interests of the enterprise first [31], 
which is of great benefit to the operation and development of the en-
terprise. Agency costs would be reduced and managers could be moti-
vated to be more dedicated to seeking benefits for the company [18]. 
Besides, tournament theory believes that the gap of compensation be-
tween CEOs and ordinary workers could effectively improve company 
performance [32]. According to social network theory, companies 
should use higher salaries than the market could give to retain 
well-connected executives [15]. These theories generally believe that a 
moderate increase in executive compensation has a positive effect on 
corporate performance, which has been also confirmed in this study. 
What could be learned from this study is that, energy companies 
should establish a reasonable compensation system in order to effec-
tively motivate managers. Afzal [33] argued that PRP (performance 
related pay) plays an important role in motivating employees, including 
Table 1 
Definition of variables.  
Variables Definition Abbreviation 
Tobin’s Q TQ = MV/(TA - INA - GW) TQ 
ROA Net profit/total asset ROA 
ROE Net profit/average shareholders’ equity ROE 
Cash payment Natural logarithm of the total remuneration 
of the top three executives 
LNS 
Equity Proportion of shares held by executives MSR 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the total asset LNA 
Gearing Debt/equity GEAR 
Ownership 
concentration 
Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder LHR 
Board committees Number of board committees NO  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
ROE 11.480 8.933 10.226 − 7.652 67.712 
ROA 6.274 4.438 5.658 − 4.758 28.020 
TQ 1.039 0.928 0.907 0.037 11.723 
LNS 8.584 1.942 9.550 4.229 11.727 
MSR 1.097 5.464 0.210 0.000 57.108 
LNA 9.876 1.217 9.911 4.495 13.529 
GEAR 0.273 0.272 0.204 0.000 0.935 
LHR 21.634 22.303 10.200 0.370 87.460 
NO 4.441 1.157 4.000 3.000 9.000  
ROA=α0 + α1LNSit + α2MSRit + α3LNAit + α4GEARit + α5LHRit + α6NOit + μit (3)   
ROE= α0 + α1LNSit + α2MSRit + α3LNAit + α4GEARit + α5LHRit + α6NOit + μit (4)   
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executives. Due to the increasingly serious problems of global energy 
shortage and environmental pollution, vigorously developing renewable 
energy and accelerating the promotion and application of new energy 
have become the consensus of people around the world [34]. If energy 
companies want to achieve long-term development, they should actively 
innovate. Energy companies could link executive bonuses with innova-
tion to promote the further development of the company. 
The relationship coefficients between manager shareholding ratio 
(MSR) and ROE (0.2067741), ROA (0.0856012), and TQ (0.0141415) 
are all positive. The positive relationship is very significant, respectively 
at the level of 1%, 10%, and 5%. Hypothesis 2 is strongly proved that the 
manager shareholding ratio positively links with corporate perfor-
mance. Especially, agency theory argues that through granting execu-
tives a certain share and making executives the owners of the company, 
the interests of executives and shareholders would be aligned. As a 
result, the principal-agent problem could be effectively dealt with, and 
managers would pay much attention to the long-term development of 
the company and make efforts to make better decision. Equity incentives 
are commonly used recently, and some people even think it is more 
effective than cash rewards [35]. If executives are given a lot of 
performance-related bonuses, they will tend to pursue good perfor-
mance for getting higher bonuses. However, in the process, it is likely to 
happen that executives seek short-term benefits at the expense of the 
companies’ long-term interests [36]. After being granted shares, exec-
utives benefit more directly from the operating performance of the 
companies, which leads them to treat corporate affairs more impartially 
and devotedly, because they have a deeper trust and dependence on the 
company [37]. 
In addition, the data comparison shows that the correlation coeffi-
cient between LNS and performance is larger than that between MSR 
and performance. We find that in the energy industry, compensation 
incentives for executives are more useful than equity incentives, which 
is contrary to the conclusion of Qiang and Terry [35]. 
The natural logarithm of total assets of the companies (LNA), which 
represents the company size, is negatively correlated with all variables 
representing company performance. The regression coefficient between 
LNA and ROE is − 0.2873648, between LNA and ROA is − 0.4780073, 
and between LNA and Tobin’s Q is − 0.0828538. This result completely 
contradicts hypothesis 3. This may be caused by a variety of reasons. 
First of all, large companies have complex organizational structures. 
Second, complex business processes would cause a waste of resources, 
both human resources and material resources [38]. Third, employees of 
large companies lack direct contact with executives. Therefore, they 
could not be directly influenced by the attractiveness of executives, 
which often has a positive impact on small companies [39]). Fourth, 
Ching Ching (2013) believes that mergers and acquisitions could not 
improve company performance. Finally, the sample only includes listed 
energy companies on a large scale. If companies that are not listed are 
included, the results may be different. 
Gearing has a significantly positive relationship with return on eq-
uity on the level of 0.1% and the coefficient is 7.837191. The coefficient 
with return on asset is slightly negative (− 0.1613288) and that with 
Tobin’s Q is 0.275022 at 10%. In general, gearing of energy companies is 
negatively related with the corporate performance. Although the 
regression result does not match hypothesis 4, it is consistent with some 
other researches. For the instance, the study of Dahya et al. [40] on UK 
companies found that gearing has a significantly positive impact on 
company performance. They have strong profitability and therefore 
have a strong debt repayment ability. 
The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is positively 
correlated with the three performance indicators, and the coefficients 
are 0.0332416, 0.0583835 and 0.0054032, respectively. This shows that 
the higher the equity concentration, the better the performance of the 
company, which is consistent with hypothesis 5. In companies with low 
equity concentration, the diversification of equity results in low 
decision-making efficiency and supervision effectiveness. However, in 
companies with a high degree of equity concentration, the largest 
shareholder or the shareholders with the most sharesholders as the 
decision-making power of the company, which could greatly improve 
the efficiency of decision-making. In addition, they are closely related to 
the interests of the company, which leads them to attach great impor-
tance to the profit and loss and other affairs within the company. 
Therefore, the more concentrated the shareholding, the more power and 
motivation the major shareholders often have to defend their own in-
terests, which is conducive to the healthy operation of the company 
[21]. 
The number of committees variable is negatively linked with ROE 
(− 0.7797987), ROA (− 0.497529), and TQ (− 0.0904013). The result is 
totally in contrast with hypothesis 6. Usually, researchers consider a 
large number of committees as a sign of good corporate governance 
[23]. However, too many committees may lead to organizational 
redundancy, which in turn causes a waste of resources and negatively 
affects corporate performance [41]. Because many committees are not 
for the purpose of improving profits, such as protecting the rights of 
Table 3 
Pearson correlation coefficient.   
ROE ROA TQ LNS MSR LNA GEAR LHR NO 
ROE 1.0000         
ROA 0.7076 1.0000        
TQ 0.0947 0.1925 1.0000       
LNS 0.2167 0.4058 − 0.1357 1.0000      
MSR 0.2001 0.1766 0.0945 0.1333 1.0000     
LNA 0.0573 0.0712 − 0.1387 0.3787 − 0.0145 1.0000    
GEAR − 0.0122 − 0.2654 0.1613 − 0.7272 0.0386 − 0.1875 1.0000   
LHR − 0.1718 − 0.3148 0.1254 − 0.8699 − 0.1363 − 0.1018 0.6687 1.0000  
NO − 0.0840 − 0.0243 − 0.1931 0.3255 − 0.0933 0.3494 − 0.3990 − 0.2766 1.0000  
Table 4 
Regression results.   







































1014 1014 1014 
R-squared 0.1212 0.2196 0.0601 
Adj R- 
squared 
0.1160 0.2150 0.0545 
_cons − 4.777394 − 2.463874 1.630256 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
stand for statistical significance at the 0.1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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employees or the environment, responding to the supervision of social 
organizations and meeting policy requirements. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to simply consider the value of the committee from an 
economic perspective. 
This article uses two methods for robustness test, the results are 
shown in Appendix. First, all data from WRDS are tested and compared 
separately. According to the table, most of the values are similar and the 
difference is within the normal range. The coefficients between LNS and 
ROE, MSR and ROE, LNS and ROA, and MSR and ROA only change 
slightly and the significance levels only decrease a little. Besides, the 
coefficients and significance levels of other variables almost maintain 
unchanged. In another robustness test we replace the total compensation 
of the top three executives with the average value of the compensation 
of all disclosed executives. All the coefficients remain stable and the sign 
and the significance level do not change. 
5. Conclusion 
In contemporary society, the extremely high compensation of exec-
utives has resulted into widespread attention from stakeholders from all 
over the world. Whether in developed or developing countries, CEO 
payment is usually tens or hundreds of times that of ordinary employees, 
which has caused public dissatisfaction. Some campaigns against the 
high salaries of executives have emerged around the world. However, 
many theories and studies hold opposite views. The most recognized 
agency theory argues that paying executives high compensation could 
align the interest of shareholders and executives, hence reducing agency 
costs and improving corporate performance. In order to understand the 
relationship between executive compensation and performance in the 
energy industry, this article selects 121 energy companies from around 
the world and collect their data from 2010 to 2019 for research. 
The key findings are as follows. First of all, both executive 
compensation and shareholding ratio have a significant positive influ-
ence on firm performance, indicating the effectiveness of compensation 
incentive and equity incentive. This result could be explained by widely 
believed theories from accounting, finance and economics. In addition, 
this study also found that executive compensation has a greater positive 
impact on corporate performance compared to equity holdings. 
As for company size, this article finds that it has a weak negative 
impact on corporate performance in energy companies. Gearing is 
positively associated with return on equity. Given that most of the listed 
energy companies have low risks, they could borrow money appropri-
ately to promote development. Equity concentration has a positive effect 
on the performance of energy firms. Once the largest shareholder or the 
shareholders with the most shares hold the decision-making power, the 
decision-making would be efficient. The number of committees is 
negatively correlated with corporate performance. The reason is that too 
many committees may lead to additional organizational costs. However, 
companies could not simply dissolve the committees because commit-
tees not only exist for monitoring purposes but they play crucial roles 
such as protecting the environment. Energy companies should improve 
the efficiency of committees and corporate governance. 
This article still has many shortcomings. For example, for the con-
venience of data collection, only listed companies are selected. There are 
many large energy companies that have not gone public, especially some 
emerging new energy companies. 
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Appendix  
Table A1 
Robustness Test 1   
ROE1(WRDS and CSMAR) ROE2(WRDS) ROA1(WRDS and CSMAR) ROA2(WRDS) 
LNS 2.268521*** 2.21915** 1.672336*** 3.433655*** 
MSR 0.2067741*** 0.1400037** 0.0856012*** 0.0433425* 
LNA − 0.2873648 − 0.455093 − 0.4780073*** − 1.216151*** 
GEAR 7.837191*** 13.12992*** − 0.1613288 0.6933536 
LHR 0.0332416 − 0.4209869*** 0.0583835*** − 0.1840284*** 
NO − 0.7797987** − 0.772643** − 0.497529*** − 0.507201*** 
Number of obs 1014 702 1014 702 
R-squared 0.1212 0.1857 0.2196 0.2073 
Adj R-squared 0.1160 0.1787 0.2150 0.2005 
_cons − 4.777394 0.4831107 − 2.463874 − 10.43419   
Table A2 
Robustness Test 2   
ROE1 ROE2(average comp) ROA1 ROA2(average comp) 
LNS 2.268521*** __ 1.672336*** __ 
avgcomp __ 2.116578*** __ 1.661527*** 
MSR 0.2067741*** 0.2133269*** 0.0856012*** 0.0889357*** 
LNA − 0.2873648 − 0.2253382 − 0.4780073*** − 0.4784696*** 
GEAR 7.837191*** 7.328933*** − 0.1613288 − 0.3789257 
LHR 0.0332416 0.0206193 0.0583835*** 0.05502*** 
NO − 0.7797987** − 0.7653275** − 0.497529*** − 0.4762742*** 
Number of obs 1014 1014 1014 1014 
R-squared 0.1212 0.1160 0.2196 0.2160 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A2 (continued )  
ROE1 ROE2(average comp) ROA1 ROA2(average comp) 
Adj R-squared 0.1160 0.1108 0.2150 0.2113 
_cons − 4.777394 − 0.8251656 − 2.463874 − 0.0400428  
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